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Raymond Corbey, Robert Layton,
and Jeremy Tanner
Archaeologists have approached the study of
art from several directions, drawing their
inspiration variously from evolutionary biol-
ogy, anthropology, and art history. We exam-
ine the strengths and weaknesses of each of
these approaches and hope to demonstrate
the unique opportunities open to archae-
ology in the study of art, from its origins to
the recent past.
What is Art?
The first problem facing archaeologists inter-
ested in studying the art of past societies is
identifying their proper subject matter. What
is art? The modern concept of art is a recent
historical phenomenon. The word art once
referred to any specialized skill or application
of technical knowledge including, for
example, the art of medicine, the art of rhet-
oric. Only in the eighteenth century did the
term acquire its modern specialized reference
to the ‘‘fine arts’’ of painting, sculpture, archi-
tecture, music, and gardening – all character-
ized by technical skill, imagination, and
aesthetic expression (Kristeller 1990;
Williams 1983, s.v. ‘‘aesthetics,’’ ‘‘art’’). This
development was associated with important
changes in the institutional frameworks for
the production, appropriation, and con-
sumption of art. Art, in particular painting,
was increasingly produced as a commodity
for a relatively anonymous market, rather
than directly commissioned by patrons. This
gave rise to the modern Romantic conception
of the artist as an isolated individual express-
ing inner experience or feelings (Pears 1988;
Wolff 1981: 9–25). Artefacts which had pre-
viously been encountered in specific practical
contexts, as objects of ritual in churches, or
political monuments in public spaces, were
extracted from those contexts and displayed
as autonomous, self-sufficient objects of dis-
interested aesthetic contemplation, in collec-
tions in elite country houses and later the
public art galleries and museums sponsored
by modern national states (Duncan and
Wallach 1980; Abrams 1989).
Both art history and archaeology were
invented as academic disciplines during the
course of the eighteenth century as part and
parcel of the same process, replacing ama-
teur traditions of antiquarianism (Schnapp
1993). One key figure in this transformation
was J. J. Winckelmann, who connected
literary accounts of the development of
sculpture from classical antiquity with the
surviving remains of statues in Rome.
By this means Winckelmann produced a
systematic account of the development of
the styles of ancient art as expressions of
national character, determined by climatic
environment and political organization.
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The distinction between works of art, the
proper object of aesthetic and art historical
discourse, and mere artefacts (which could
be treated in more narrowly archaeological
terms) was articulated in terms of the level
of technical skill, aesthetic sensibility, and
individual (or ‘‘national’’ – Egyptian, Greek,
Roman) artistic imagination embodied in
a particular object (Potts 1982). Following
the model of Winckelmann, Greek red figure
and black figure pots (Figure 19.1), once
looked on as mere artefacts, were elevated
to the status of art objects when it was dis-
covered that individual artists’ hands could
be recognized and even named (on the basis
of signatures), and their changing style could
be used as a proxy for the history of the
(lost) paintings of classical antiquity, de-
scribed in the works of ancient authors
(Vickers 1987). Winckelmann’s stylistic
scheme, which passed from archaic begin-
nings through classical florescence to post-
classical decline, became the model not only
for the national histories of European art,
but also for the description of the origins,
development, and decay of world archae-
ological cultures (for example formative,
classic, and post-classic Mesoamerican
culture – Kubler 1970).
It is by no means clear that we can legitim-
ately transfer modern Western concepts of
art and artists, along with all their implica-
tions, to past cultures and societies. In an-
cient Greece the word often translated as art,
techne, referred to any skilled application of
knowledge in practice. Similarly, in ancient
Egypt, there is no single word that refers to
art or artist, but instead a range of terms each
related to the particular materials that the
artists/craftsmen in question use: qstj,
worker in bone and ivory; nbw, gold-worker;
qd, ‘‘former’’ or ‘‘shaper’’ for potter or brick-
layer (Baines 1994; Drenkhahn 1995). Dif-
ferent researchers adopt different conceptual
strategies to overcome this problem. We seek
to replace the culturally relative concept of
art, with a harder analytical (generally func-
tional) concept – such as ‘‘visual communi-
cation’’ or ‘‘expressive-affective symbolism’’
(Layton 1981: 4–5; Tanner 1992) – of which
the modern concept can be seen as a special
limited case. Others admit the irretrievably
relativist character of the concept art, and
recognize that in writing about the history
of art in China, for example, one is grouping
together objects including terracotta sculp-
tures, wall paintings, and ritual bronzes that
would never have fallen under the same
category for their original producers and
users (Clunas 1997: 9–13). In the cases of
the prehistoric societies with which archae-
ologists are most typically concerned, we can
only guess how members may have concep-
tualized the objects and processes we now
classify as art.
Visual communication implies the pur-
poseful use of regular visual forms that are
intended to communicate ideas, whether or
not we can decode those messages. The
Figure 19.1 Attic black-figure amphora, signed
by Exekias, with scene of combat between Achil-
les and Penthesilea ca. 530 bc. Ht: 16.5 inches.
British Museum GR 1836.2–24.12. Photo:
Museum.
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definition of art as visual communication
is relatively easy to apply cross-culturally,
because it avoids having to determine
whether other peoples’ aesthetic criteria co-
incide with ours, or whether we and they
share imaginative systems of metaphor
and symbolism. This is especially difficult
for prehistoric cultures, but it is always
easy to read the wrong message into art pro-
duced in other cultures. The word art is
sometimes used as a synonym for pictures
conveying a message in our culture, as
when advertising agencies talk about
‘‘doing the art work.’’ But is an advertise-
ment art? The same question can be asked
of objects produced in the small-scale
cultures anthropologists and archaeologists
study. Visual forms such as technical draw-
ings, photographs, or models produced
for purely utilitarian purposes may be
disqualified as art, because they lack the
special qualities of form or imaginative con-
tent that sets art apart. Qualities of form, of
rhythm, balance, and harmony can be
detected in prehistoric art (e.g., bisons in
the cave of Lascaux, which are about
16,000 years old: Figure 19.2). Qualities of
imaginative content may also be apparent in
imagery through which the entities repre-
sented in the art have deeper resonances, or
stand for more general and profound ideas.
Plaques from the former royal palace of the
West African kings of Benin depict the king
grasping a leopard in each hand; the ruler of
civilization controls the ruler of the wild
forest. Such visual imagery is harder to
detect in prehistory, although one of the
oldest known three-dimensional carvings
appears to depict a lion-headed human
(Hohlenstein-Stadel, Germany, about
30,000 years old: Figure 19.3). There is,
however, a strong school of thought in an-
thropology that denies the usefulness of a
semiotic model for studying art as a cultural
phenomenon. This argument has been ad-
vanced by Forge (1967, 1970), O’Hanlon
(1989), and Gell (1998). All three have
worked in Papua New Guinea, focusing on
predominantly non-figurative art, whereas
several exponents of a semiotic approach to
art have worked in Australia (Munn 1973;
Morphy 1991; Layton 1981). The preferred
theoretical approach may therefore be dic-
tated to some extent by the character of the
cultural traditions studied. Gell, however,
exemplifies his theory as much through the
highly iconic and symbolic art of India as
through decorative aspects of the arts of
Oceania. He rejects use of a linguistic
model in the analysis of art and dismisses
aesthetics as a concept taken from Western
art history.
In Gell’s view art objects play an active
part in social relationships. They extend
their maker’s or user’s agency. Agency is
the ability to act in particular ways, where
more than one course of action is possible
(Giddens 1984). Art objects have agency
when they affect the response of those who
see or use them. While the notion of art
objects as agents has been used before (e.g.,
Layton 1981: 43, 85), the originality of
Gell’s approach lies in his refusal to treat art
objects as vehicles for the expression of
ideas. At his most extreme, he conceives
of art objects as possessing the same kind of
agency as land mines (Gell 1998: 21).
Perhaps the most ecumenical way to con-
ceptualize art for the purposes of this survey,
and the most appropriate to give a sense of
both the range of objects and approaches
archaeologists deploy, is to look at how the
concept of art is used by archaeologists in
actual practice.
Archaeological art as a field of study is
too varied and has too fuzzy boundaries to
admit a precise definition, but here, never-
theless, is a tentative delineation and identi-
fication of some prominent features. It
concerns intentionally produced, repeated
objects or patterns, which may be more or
less sacred or profane, private or public.
Such objects or patterns deliberately express,
and communicate to others, beliefs and
values, or affective meanings, which may be
multiple, unstable, ambiguous, contradict-
ory, and vary according to context and re-
ceiver. They may embody, contain, or depict
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ancestors, spirits, or gods, either appeasing
them, evoking them, or narrating their
accomplishments. Such objects are often
made with skill and imagination, and are
often aesthetically pleasing to their makers.
One may think of the features highlighted
in this description as family resemblances in
the sense of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the aph-
orisms 65 to 69 of his Philosophical Investi-
gations Wittgenstein criticized the notion of
essence as a set of features common to all
cases. None of the features identified above,
even intentionality, is ‘‘essential’’ in the sense
of being necessarily shared by all members of
the set. Like fibers in a thread, they overlap,
but no one fiber runs through the whole
thread. Wittgenstein elaborates upon the
example of games, and what he says here
holds for archaeological art too: there are
board games, card games, ball games, Olym-
pic games, and so on, and they are all games,
but ‘‘if you look at them you will not see
something that is common to all, but similar-
ities, relationships, and a whole series of
them at that . . . overlapping and criss-
crossing’’ (Wittgenstein 1998). They crop
up and disappear, like the various resem-
blances between members of a family such
as build, facial features, eye color, gait, and
temperament.
Every individual piece of art has blurred
edges or fuzzy boundaries in another sense
too, which adds to the complexities of inter-
preting art outlined above. Art is so intri-
cately connected to local circumstances and
suspended in webs of local meanings that we
may draw our interpretive circles ever wider
without reaching a point where it would be
natural to stop. Obviously we cannot go on
indefinitely when interpreting, for example,
the meaning of the dwarves that frequently
appear in Nilotic scenes picturing the flooded
Nile, for centuries popular throughout the
Roman Empire. Exactly where we stop is a
decision taken for practical reasons, not least
lack of data. The problems of interpretation
encountered here are analogous to the ‘‘frame
problem’’ as discussed in analytic philosophy
and artificial intelligence (Haselager 1997)
and the ‘‘hermeneutical circle’’ in hermeneut-
ical philosophy (Gadamer 1989). Both have
to do with the substantial role of (framing)
circumstantial knowledge and presuppos-
itions in human knowledge, interpretation,
and communication.
Like anthropologists, archaeologists can
draw upon various and often conflicting
theoretical orientations, which make a
world of difference to the sort of questions
they pose and the answers they give. Further-
more, boundaries between disciplines are
hard to draw. It is not unusual to come
across archaeological researchers trained
as art historians, philologists, ethnologists,
biological anthropologists, geographers,
palaeontologists, or in a combination of
these disciplines, and it is very usual that ex-
pertise from various disciplines is drawn
upon in any individual archaeological re-
search project.
Publications on archaeological art
(ranging from Upper Palaeolithic cave art
through Olmec temples to terracotta grave
gifts in Han China) may exclusively stress or
combine the following types of analysis:
. Iconographic: the meaning of specific
motifs, such as the artefacts associated
with particular saints in Christian reli-
gious art.
. Formal: the style of a work of art, and the
stylistic tradition it belongs to.
. Semiotic: the ways in which objects and
patterns refer beyond themselves.
. Functionalist: the practical purpose the
work of art served, for example as ex-
pressing and strengthening group iden-
tity, or appeasing spirits and thereby
reducing anxiety.
. Aesthetic: how, why, and to whom it is
attractive.
. Structuralist: the recurrent combinations
of elements and the underlying structures
they hint at.
. Deconstructivist: reacting against the
rigidity of structuralist analysis, stressing
the elusiveness of meaning and the sub-
jectivity of the analyst.
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. Critical: ways in which the art reflects,
legitimizes, or criticizes power relations.
. Hermeneutic: interpreting the maker’s
intentions through empathy and context-
ual information.
. Processual: the contribution of art
objects to the ways in which humans
adapt to their environment.
How one conceptualizes art and where
one draws the boundary between art and
non-art is not merely a scholastic issue. It
affects both the methods archaeologists use
to interpret art and the status, as ‘‘know-
ledge,’’ that can be attributed to such inter-
pretations. Art as skill points towards artistic
technologies and the artist as producer.
Art as objectified meaning suggests icono-
graphic and other methodologies to decode
those meanings. Art as creative imagination
might invite attempts to identify individual
artists and their specific subjectivity. Art
as visual communication highlights the
social and relational character of art. Art as
affective expression implies interest in the
aesthetic and stylistic means by which affect
is culturally shaped. Strongly relativist con-
ceptions of art emphasize the present-
oriented character of art interpretation, a
mediation of the past for the present: the
very idea of ‘‘art’’ interpretation involves re-
lating to past objects in ways which may
not have made sense for their original users,
and indeed may not make sense to future
readers of our interpretations. Every gener-
ation gets the Renaissance (or the Upper
Palaeolithic) it deserves. Conversely, more
robust ‘‘realist’’ conceptualizations of art
may be associated with stronger claims
that our interpretations and explanations of
past art are at least adequate to the kinds
of meanings such objects held in their past
settings, and the social contexts which
shaped the way they functioned and the
form they took. Further, critical discussion
of both interpretations and interpretive
methodologies can produce cumulative pro-
gress in our knowledge and understanding of
past art, interpretations which are not
just different from but also better than
those of former scholars.
Anthropological Insights and
Archaeological Method
Unlike anthropologists, archaeologists
cannot observe directly how an art object
was fabricated and used, nor can they ask
its makers and users what it represents or
what it was used for. Even anthropologists
often find it difficult to learn about an item’s
meaning. There may be difficulties of trans-
lation, and deeper levels of meaning of the
item may be inaccessible to native interlocu-
tors who have not been fully initiated. Often
objects or patterns are ambiguous, have dif-
ferent meanings to different people or gener-
ations, or no clear meaning at all.
Archaeologists find it much more difficult,
compared to anthropologists, and some con-
sider it impossible, to reconstruct what
meanings specific visual forms were intended
to encode and communicate. Rock pitting
which seems to be art may prove to be a by-
product of some technical process (such as
grinding axes or pounding fruit).
Archaeologists have the added problem
that contextual data may be sparse, precise
dating impossible. Several reindeer may be
depicted next to each other on the wall of an
Upper Palaeolithic cave in southern France,
but it is rarely clear whether they were made
at the same time by the same person, or are
separated by weeks, years, centuries, or even
several millennia. Clottes describes a
puzzling case from the French cave of Cos-
quer. Two bison, painted in the same style,
were directly dated. One was found to be
more than 8,000 years older than the other.
Did the same style persist for 8,000 years, or
was one painted with charcoal left on the
floor of the cave by other visitors 8,000
years previously (Clottes 1988: 115)? Even
when there is some degree of cultural con-
tinuity between the makers of art and their
present-day descendants, as in the case of
Maya cloth or Aboriginal rock paintings,
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the extent to which meanings have changed
in the course of time is difficult to ascertain.
Awealth of information about the content of
an ancient art tradition may still fail to eluci-
date the precise meaning of certain figures
and scenes. Many thousands of spectacular
‘‘Celtic’’ art objects are now known from
graves and sacred sites, richly decorated
with human and animal figures and geomet-
ric patterns, and contextualized by system-
atic archaeological excavation. Nonetheless,
we still know little about the myths these
figures must have been associated with in
their original cultural setting.
Archaeologists are therefore usually
forced to refrain from delving deeply into
the iconographic and cultural meanings of
objects. Unlike anthropologists and art his-
torians, archaeologists concentrate on recon-
structing and explaining the fabrication of
objects, the spatiotemporal distribution and
variability of their motifs and styles, how
they relate to ecology, and the like.
In recent years it has become popular to
interpret much prehistoric rock art as the
product of shamanism. The shaman is a
figure who enters trance to communicate
with the spirit world, and uses the knowledge
or power he gains to cure illness or secure
hunting success for his community. Whether
shamanism is a unitary phenomenon, or an
artefact of academic analysis, is debatable
(Hultkrantz 1989; Vitebsky 1995). The
South African archaeologist Lewis-Williams
prompted the current popularity of shamanic
interpretations through his work on the art
of the Drakensberg Mountains. Lewis-
Williams relied in part on highly opaque
statements obtained from an indigenous
survivor of a nineteenth-century massacre.
He also found specific parallels between
the iconography of the rock art and the
ethnography of a wider region, including
the depiction of figures wearing documented
shamanic costume and performing dances
resembling those described ethnographically.
Another inspiration for the current trend
was Reichel-Dolmatoff’s ethnography of
shamanism among the Tucanoa of South
America. Reichel-Dolmatoff described a
range of simple geometric motifs in their
art which Tucanoa say depict shapes seen
in shamanic trance, and pointed to parallel
‘‘entoptic’’ shapes recorded in Western
studies of drug-induced states of altered con-
sciousness (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978). A
restudy of South African rock art reveals
formally similar motifs, although no match-
ing ethnography of entoptics (Lewis-
Williams and Dowson 1988). Whitley’s an-
alysis of Coso rock art (southwest United
States) identifies references to shamanic
practices. Whitley (1992) has limited ethno-
graphic evidence that a Californian rock
shelter containing geometric paintings was
a girls’ initiation site. Since then, ancient
rock art in Europe and Australia has been
construed as the product of shamanism
(Clottes and Lewis-Williams 1998; Chippin-
dale et al. 2000).
There is no doubt that some recent hunter-
gatherer rock art was inspired by trance ex-
perience and that such experiences were
sometimes harnessed by shamans (Hann et
al., in press; Reichel-Dolmatoff 1978). It is
rare, however, for archaeologists both to pro-
pose a shamanic interpretation and ways of
falsifying it (see, however, Francfort 1998;
Dronfield 1996). Hedges (2000) and Quin-
lan (2000) have critically reviewed Whitley’s
use of Californian ethnography, while De
Beaune (1998) has examined the recurrent
fascination of Upper Palaeolithic archaeolo-
gists with the ethnography of shamanism.
The Earliest Art
Arguably, art is produced in all living human
cultures, but by no other living species. The
oldest secure dates for rock art come from
the paintings in the French cave of Chauvet,
where paintings of two rhino and a bison
have been dated to ca. 30,000 bp. The
Upper Palaeolithic cave art of France and
Spain spans a continuous period from about
30,000 to 12,000 bp. The art of the Upper
Palaeolithic was produced by anatomically
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modern humans. The skilled draftsmanship
with which animals are portrayed is as fine as
any art among recent small-scale societies.
The number of species, that is, the ‘‘vocabu-
lary’’ of animal subjects, is comparable to the
number of species portrayed in recent
Australian or southern African rock art. But
we must not forget that the purpose and
meaning of the art to those who painted
or were intended to respond to it were
specific to the cultures of the Solutriean or
Magdalenian.
The geometric rock art of southern Aus-
tralia may date from 30,000 bp or earlier. If
so, this would be the oldest continuously
practiced art tradition, persisting in the
recent rock art of central Australia and con-
temporary commercial Aboriginal art. Both
Australia and Europe are far from the
regions of East and South Africa where
modern humans are thought to have evolved.
Fallen slabs bearing paintings excavated at
Apollo 11 shelter in southern Namibia have
been dated to between 19,000 and 26,000
years bp (Wendt 1974). This must have been
long after the ancestors of indigenous
Australians left Africa, and after the arrival
of modern humans in Europe. Most southern
African rock art was painted or engraved
during the last few hundred years.
Before Art
If art originated before the appearance of
modern humans, then it was first practiced
by creatures who no longer exist and whose
culture has no modern parallels. Modern art
and language have many-layered structures
and leave unmistakable material traces but,
just as the first simple organisms exuded no
durable shell or skeleton, the first expres-
sions of art were probably ephemeral and
simpler in structure. We may never know
some, perhaps even much art from the past;
decorated and gendered carrying nets, for
example, or body tattoos and scarifications,
performing and verbal art, or Neanderthal
clothing.
Human culture may have been practiced
for some time, perhaps a long time, before
cultural behavior became sufficiently formal-
ized and engrained in material artefacts to
leave a recognizable trace. It is not accept-
able, therefore, to consider all available frag-
mentary hints of expressive material as the
beginnings of art. Early examples of appar-
ently decorative or iconic artefacts may be
chance products of natural weathering or, if
deliberate, may have been the result of idio-
syncratic play. Before the appearance of ana-
tomically modern, Upper Palaeolithic
humans, no undisputed art objects seem to
be known. There have, however, been occa-
sional finds of older, Neanderthal Middle
Palaeolithic stones and bones with relatively
systematically engraved lines of unclear
significance which have been interpreted as
non-utilitarian.
Evidence for the early use of ocher comes
from the Howieson’s Poort industry of South
Africa, between 50,000 to 75,000 bp
(Barham 1998; Klein 1995). Unfortunately,
there is no indication of what it was used for.
Even if it was used to color artefacts or the
body, that is not necessarily a visual language
in the modern sense. If color signified a
simple unitary message such as ‘‘adult’’ or
‘‘sexually receptive’’ the use of ocher would
have been no more complex than a non-
human call system. Many species, including
non-human primates, use a ‘‘call system,’’ in
which single cries signify ‘‘predator!’’, ‘‘my
turf!’’, etc.
If one stresses aesthetics, a better, or at
least a borderline, case of art before modern
humans is provided by a tiny proportion of
the billions of Acheulean handaxes produced
in Africa and, subsequently, Eurasia from
about 1.5 million to 35,000 years ago (if
the Mousterian of Acheulean Tradition is
included). An estimated 1 in 100, or perhaps
even 1 per 50 (which is an enormous number,
given the total amount of handaxes) shows
up symmetry and regularity seemingly
beyond practical requirements (Figure
19.4). Such specimens may have been very
pleasing to their makers, and may have had
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additional functions and meanings, perhaps
articulating clan or age group identity.
One intriguing hypothesis is that, in addition
to their other functions, they may have
served in sexual selection, signaling the gen-
etic fitness of their makers (Kohn and
Mithen 1999). While this is difficult to
verify, applying the explanatory force of evo-
lutionary biology to such archaeological
phenomena is extremely fruitful (cf:
Shennan, ch. 1).
Highly regular handaxes are probably one
of the earliest manifestations of an aesthetic
sense, although it has been argued that
bowerbird nests provide a non-human paral-
lel (Miller 2000). Another family resem-
blance that is germane according to many
(how difficult it is to avoid essentialism and
live up to Witttgenstein’s very point!) is lin-
guistic or narrative meaning. There is no
consensus, however, on the extent to which
the makers of the handaxes – Homo erectus,
Homo heidelbergensis, and Homo nean-
derthalensis, among others – were linguistic-
ally competent. It is clear that during the
1.5 million years during which Acheulean
handaxes were made, major changes in
cognitive, linguistic, and behavioral compe-
tences took place, but scholars disagree
on the nature and the timing of these devel-
opments.
Art and Adaptation
For many art historians as well as cultural
anthropologists, culture is not so much a
mode of adaptation supplementing and
interacting with genetics, but a means to
transcend the limitations of biology. Art is
deemed to testify to humankind’s ability to
rise above the struggle for survival and
endow life with symbolic, moral, and reli-
gious meaning. Together with such (associ-
ated) features as religion and language, art is
one of the last bastions of the presumably
unique human soul, still resisting the evolu-
Figure 19.4 Very regular Middle Palaeolithic handaxe, Lailly, Vanne river valley, France. Mousterian.
(From Deloze et al. 1994: fig. 126. Courtesy of J.-L. Locht.)
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tionary approaches to culture which have
been expanding over the past few decades.
That presupposition is challenged by evo-
lutionary psychology and behavioral ecol-
ogy, which stress the uniformity of all
behaving organisms, including humans.
Such natural history approaches have finally
begun to spill over even into the study of art.
There are now scholars who focus on the
evolutionary backgrounds and functions of
forms of art and aesthetic experience as one
of many human cultural behaviors, intri-
cately connected with genetic make-up,
epigenetic development, and biological adap-
tation. Such scholars pose fresh questions
about art. They typically go beyond cultur-
ally specific meanings in the search for
human universals: species-wide inborn per-
ceptual schemes and preferences, cognitive
and motivational features underlying cul-
tural variability and connected to the solving
of adaptational problems faced by our early
hunter-gatherer ancestors (e.g., Miller 2000).
An early contribution to this field com-
pared phallic display by male baboons
guarding their troop with the same feature
in tribal statues, for example wooden ances-
tor figures functioning as village guardians in
Dayak villages in Kalimantan, Indonesia
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1978). The universal mean-
ing of the facial configuration of eyes, nose,
and mouth and the force of the direct gaze in
animals, humans, and art objects was pointed
out early on. Symmetry of face and body is
found attractive by other humans (Grammer
and Thornhill 1994). Symmetry and repeti-
tive patterns in the natural environment draw
the attention immediately, and probably in-
fluence the appearance and appreciation of
similar features in art (Onians 1996). Art also
has roles to play in human dealings with such
universal features of existence as death, birth,
sickness, and fertility, which to some extent
makes it transcend culturally specific aspects
in content and style.
Van Damme (1996, 2000) points to a pref-
erence in many cultures for such visual prop-
erties as symmetry and balance, clarity,
shininess or brightness, novelty, and smooth-
ness (which, in the case of human skin, is
seen as an index of health). There is ethno-
graphic evidence from West Africa which
supports this claim (Boone 1993; Lawal
1993). Van Damme developed a transcul-
tural evolutionary aesthetics attempting to
explain universals and differences in aes-
thetic preference by drawing upon both uni-
versally human, neuropsychologically based
tendencies and varying sociocultural ideals
acquired through social formation. An in-
herited predisposition to respond affectively
to such collective ideals, he hypothesizes,
accounts for favorable responses to art
forms which he construes as visual meta-
phors for these ideals. He argues that affect-
ive responses to collective ideals are
adaptive, since they enhance various forms
of cooperation that benefit individuals and
others sharing their genes.
Along similar lines, Barrow (1995) argued
that the tropical savannah habitats of early
hominids correspond to the visual prefer-
ences of present-day children and adults
across cultures, and are recreated in paint-
ings and urban parks. Other authors focus
instead on the function of art, myth, and
ritual as repositories of knowledge useful
for survival (e.g., Minc 1986), or a reinforce-
ment of solidarity in groups and alliance net-
works. One refreshing aspect of natural
history approaches to art is the downplaying
of the linguistic, mythical, and narrative
meanings of art that figure so largely in
most other approaches.
Art and Communication
The linguist Bickerton (1996) has proposed
an evolutionary stage characterized by a se-
mantically rich but syntactically poor proto-
language, which he associates with Homo
erectus. This might have constituted nothing
more than a vast vocabulary of calls.
Donald, a psychologist, on the other hand,
stresses mimetic imitation as a flexible and
creative, nonlinguistic (sic) mode of repre-
sentation and communication (Donald
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1991). This has to do with artistic compe-
tence, and imitation as another ‘‘germane’’
family resemblance. Mithen (1998) argues
that simple language may have preceded
fully modern humans: there may have been
syntax, but its function may have been
limited to regulating relationships within
the social group.
For Mithen, the diagnostic feature of fully
developed human language is its ability to
link cognitive domains. This is an essential
aspect of modeling reality, so as to explain
and predict. On the other hand, as several
authors have pointed out, language would
need the capacity to refer to things and
actions distant in time and space from the
speaker. Transcending the ‘‘here and now,’’
implying a release from proximity, was a
necessary precondition for language to sus-
tain social networks on the scale found
among modern hunter-gatherers. These
allow individual bands to hunt and gather
on neighboring bands’ territories and main-
tain various sorts of exchange relations with
them. Mellars (1998) regards Upper Palaeo-
lithic art (undoubtedly drawn from memory)
as the best evidence for the cognitive skills
that modern languages make possible.
Aitchison (1996) suggests two models for
the origin of language. These can also be
envisaged as possible origins for art as a cul-
tural system. In one, language begins as a
limited number of opposed signs based on a
clear but simple structure. In the other, every-
one is chattering away about all sorts of
things, but there is very little mutual compre-
hension. The arbitrariness of sounds in
spoken language seems to benefit from,
indeed to depend on, tightly structured
oppositions. This implies that language
more probably required Aitchison’s first
scenario. The iconicity of art might, on the
other hand, facilitate Aitchison’s second
scenario. She hypothesizes that a few small
sparks of verbal communication were
around for a long time, then the whole ‘‘lan-
guage bonfire’’ suddenly caught fire. The
archaeological evidence suggests something
similar may have occurred with art.
D’Errico (1992) postulates symbolic
meaning for personal ornaments and decor-
ated artefacts from Chaˆtelperronian sites in
Western Europe such as Roc de Combe and
Arcy-sur-Cure, along with perforated and
ochered shells associated with 100,000-
year-old burials of anatomically modern
humans at Qafzeh. He also rightly points
out that there is no ethnographic model for
the initial development of symbolic commu-
nication in humans (see also d’Errico et al.
1998). We cannot assume Neanderthal neck-
laces relied on an expressive system of
modern human complexity.
Structures, Signs, and Agents
Anthropologists traditionally distinguish be-
tween the meaning and function of sociocul-
tural traits. The function of a custom has
been defined as the contribution it makes to
satisfying the individual’s needs or to the
organization of social relations (Malinowski
1922: 515–16; 1954: 202; Radcliffe-Brown
1952: 178–9). The study of symbolism inves-
tigates the meaning of elements of culture.
The theory of communication in art begins
with structuralism. The structuralist theory
of communication is concerned with the
connection between a sound or picture and
its meaning, i.e., with signification. The
theory originated in the work of the French
sociologist Emile Durkheim (1915) on
Australian aboriginal religion. Durkheim
considered aboriginal Australian commu-
nities had preserved the original form of
human religion, which therefore showed
how meaning in human culture had come
about. He supposed the simplest, and there-
fore earliest, social structure would be one
with two segments, i.e., moieties (‘‘halves’’).
Moieties often have totemic emblems that
form opposed pairs, such as eagle hawk (a
hunting bird) and crow (a scavenging bird).
As each community grew in size, the moieties
subdivided into clans, which also had animal
emblems. Celebration of the clan’s totemic
ancestor in ritual was a reaffirmation of the
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group’s identity as a segment of society. The
association of each clan with a particular
animal emblem was arbitrary. It did not
matter whether a particular clan had snake,
possum, or kangaroo as its emblem. Clan x
was only kangaroo because it was not
possum or snake. Once the association was
established within the collective conscious-
ness, however, it seemed natural and un-
changeable. Spencer and Gillen reported
that people attached particular importance
to the designs on sacred objects and body
paintings used in ritual to represent clan
totems. The geometric style of central
Australian art was so simplified that to
Durkheim the designs seemed arbitrary. Be-
cause they are arbitrary, they depend entirely
on cultural convention; their meaning was
determined by a ‘‘collective consciousness.’’
Ferdinand de Saussure is reported to have
been influenced by Durkheim’s ideas (Ard-
ener 1971: xxxiv, quoting Doroszewski
1933; Barthes 1967: 100; Ricoeur 1976: 3).
He developed Durkheim’s model of clan to-
temism into a general theory of communica-
tion through signs. One of the crucial
additions that Saussure made was to intro-
duce the distinction between language and
speech. Speech draws upon the vocabulary
and grammar of the language to construct a
limitless series of statements. Saussure saw
language change as evolution in the system,
rather than the result of changes introduced
by individuals. Individual idiosyncrasies can
have no meaning, because they are not part
of the system. Individuals use the system, but
it exists independently of them, and has its
own dynamic.
Saussure’s primary concern was with how
ideas are related or juxtaposed to other
ideas in the structure of the language. The
American theorists Peirce and Morris, on the
other hand, argued that signs can be classi-
fied according to the way they denote or refer
to objects in the environment. An indexical
sign points to what it refers to, like a finger
post, just as ‘‘smoke ‘means’ fire’’ (or, in a
well-known example, a warm cardigan
‘‘means’’ long winter walks; Barthes 1967:
43). An indexical sign has something in
common with what it refers to: a sundial is
an index of the time of day, a weathervane an
index of wind direction (Peirce 1955: 102–
3). Icons look like what they refer to, as in
representational art, whereas symbols are
arbitrarily associated with the objects they
refer to, like the words of language. Morris
argued that symbols reproduce the structure
of what they refer to (rather than resembling
it), as when a chemical formula such as
CþO2 ¼ CO2 models the reaction between
carbon and oxygen (Morris 1938: 24). Gell’s
explanation for the capacity of art to extend
its maker’s agency by objectifying his/her
mind (presented in the final sections of Gell
1998) is very similar. In our opinion, both
signification and reference must be taken
into account. Representational art is iconic,
but what the subject matter signifies is spe-
cific to the cultural tradition within which it
was produced.
Beyond a Language of Art
Looking for meaning can sometimes be mis-
leading. The ‘‘Maroons’’ of Surinam and
French Guiana are descendants of escaped
slaves. Price and Price (1980) show that the
motifs Maroon artists carve on bowls or
weave into textiles are purely decorative.
Many ethnographers hoped to find surviving
elements of West African religion in their art.
Maroons who denied any meaning in their
art generally enjoyed only a short career as
ethnographic informants. Writers assumed
instead that the Maroons were unwilling to
tell them, or even that they had forgotten the
meaning of their own art, rather than accept
what they were told at face value. But what
does it mean, in terms of a theory of culture,
to say people have forgotten what their own
art means?
No one would deny that art and language
have different capacities. Gell argues that art
objects have a semantic value only when they
function as graphic signs, i.e., as visual
expressions of language (Gell 1998: 6).
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Otherwise, art objects are better treated, in
Gell’s view, as what Pierce called indices or
icons (Gell 1998: 13, 25). Indices can be read
as an expression of human agency (Gell 1998:
14–15), while icons (as was explained above)
look like what they refer to (Gell underesti-
mates the conventional character of represen-
tational traditions). While Gell correctly
argues that both indices and icons can func-
tion without the support of the kind of struc-
tural system that language depends upon, he
does, however, accept there can be units and
rules for combining artistic motifs within a
stylistic (cultural) system; indeed, each cul-
ture is in his view a distinctive style (Gell
1998: ch. 8). This links his approach with
that of art historians discussed below.
The notion of art as a visual language has
also suffered from the deconstructivist or
postmodernist critique of structuralism.
Derrida (1976) is famous for this attack,
although his argument derives in part from
Wittgenstein’s later theory of language.
Derrida accepted Saussure’s theory that
meaning is arbitrary or conventional, but
rejected the idea of a ‘‘collective conscious-
ness.’’ He also argued that the impossibility
of exact translation between languages
demonstrates there is no meaning that exists
outside language. As he put it, there is no
‘‘transcendental signified.’’ Knowledge is an
artefact of the system’s structure and as arbi-
trary as language itself. Derrida points out
that terms like culture, rationality, and
progress only make sense because they are
opposed to other terms: nature, superstition,
stagnation. The virtue of anthropology has
been to call the familiar into question by
showing that such oppositions are not as
self-evident as they might seem (Derrida
1978: 282).
For Derrida, language is nothing more
than a series of performances by speakers.
As language changes, so it becomes impos-
sible to recover the meanings that people
intended in the past. Each performance
leaves a ‘‘trace’’ of current usage. Thus
the ancient Australian geometric art of
Panaramittee includes many of the motifs
familiar from the recent acrylic art of central
Australia, but deploys those motifs in differ-
ent ways and with different frequencies
(Layton 1992: 189–90, 206–11).
The absence of ‘‘transcendental’’ meaning
outside language has the consequence that it
is only through practice that meaningful op-
positions are established. A language is the
outcome of practice through which the
‘‘trace’’ of opposed signs can be detected.
Since no external constraints are imposed
on this practice, meanings will constantly
change, in random fashion (see Derrida
1976: 50–60). Thus, even where an art
system exists today, and anthropologists
can learn how to make sense of it, neither
they nor members of the indigenous commu-
nity can reread past works produced in that
tradition in the way they would have been
‘‘read’’ at the time they were produced.
Derrida is clearly right to argue that lan-
guage (or art) changes through use. A lan-
guage can only exist because it is realized
through peoples’ performances. Texts record
performances that may predate the current
structure. Both Ricoeur and Eco have argued
that, while there are many ways of reading a
text, they are not all equally valid. Eco argues
that any text directs the reader toward par-
ticular readings, even if these are open-
ended, because its style locates the statement
in the context of a certain discourse (Eco
1990: 45). A discourse is ‘‘the outline of a
new way of being in the world’’ (Ricoeur
1991: 149), and a text is an invitation to see
the world in a particular way. The chicken-
and-egg problem (what came first, structure
or performance?) has been resolved by
Bourdieu (1984) and Giddens (1984)
through the concepts of habitus and struc-
turation. The structure generates perform-
ance, which recreates the structure. People
are not just users of a system that exists
independently of them in Durkheim’s ‘‘col-
lective consciousness’’; they are also agents
who both realize the structure and transform
the system through the ways they harness it
to their purposes. Meaning is negotiated.
Derrida’s mistake was to overlook reference.
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In use, language or art is constantly used to
refer to, and comment on, real-life situations
familiar to the performer and his or her audi-
ence. Historic and prehistoric archaeology
face very different problems in this regard.
Much of Upper Palaeolithic cave art is highly
iconic. We can often recognize the references
paintings or engravings make to horses and
bison, deer and ibex, and we can appreciate
the subtle ways in which the complex forms
of real animals are reduced to visions of sim-
plicity. Ironically, however, the references are
all that are left. The negotiated meanings
were lost ten thousand or more years ago.
It is now appreciated that everyone has a
slightly different interpretation of the mean-
ingful behavior of those around them (that is,
each has internalized their own habitus). It
has become clear that interpersonal variation
in interpretations varies considerably, al-
though complete randomness or chaos is
avoided (e.g., O’Hanlon 1989). In an oral
tradition, legends are constantly retold, but
there is no orthodox version. Everyone suits
their telling to the time and place, the audi-
ence and their own skills as a narrator, but
there is general consensus as to what consti-
tutes a legitimate performance (for some
examples of legends related to rock art, see
Layton 1992: 40–5).
Anthropologists now see fieldwork, and
subsequent writing, as a dialogue between
themselves and members of the community
they are seeking to understand. Archae-
ological ‘‘readings’’ of prehistoric art are an
extreme use of power, because prehistoric
people cannot respond to or challenge
them. The archaeologist can only look to
see what it was possible to do with an art
tradition (the corpus of surviving perform-
ances) and cannot test what is not ‘‘grammat-
ical,’’ or whether references have been
correctly identified.
Archaeology and Art History
The shared orientations, and the diver-
gences, between art historical and archae-
ological approaches to art can best be
understood in terms of the emphasis and
the significance attributed to the relationship
between ‘‘form’’ and ‘‘context.’’ These differ-
ences are partly rooted in the different nature
of the materials typically studied by art his-
torians and archaeologists, also partly a
result of disciplinary traditions, and finally
partly a function of the differing relation-
ships of art historians and archaeologists to
the broader extra-academic art world.
Art historians and archaeologists share
fundamental interpretive methods, such as
style analysis and iconography. The icono-
graphic protocols originally designed for
modern Western art – connecting a motif
such as the body of a man nailed to a cross,
with a particular story found in a text, the
crucifixion – can easily be transferred to the
art of complex societies with writing systems
more normally studied by archaeologists: the
myths on Greek vases, or the historical nar-
rative relief sculptures from Assyrian
palaces. Even in the absence of texts, in pre-
historic societies, closely analogous proced-
ures may be followed. Although cultural
meanings cannot be quite so precisely de-
coded, the contexts in which particular
motifs are found, or indeed in which their
viewers might have encountered the objects
represented in particular motifs, may point
towards the cultural connotations of those
motifs (Morgan 1988).
The study of Mayan art is particularly
instructive in this respect, since, with the
decipherment of Mayan script – which
plays a major role alongside figurative im-
agery on vase paintings and sculptures –
Mayan art has changed from being ‘‘prehis-
toric’’ to ‘‘historic.’’ On the one hand, there is
considerable continuity in the basic methods
of iconographical analysis used (see Kubler
1990: 201–340; Miller 1999 for ‘‘before and
after’’ decipherment surveys). On the other
hand, the availability of texts has permitted a
much more nuanced cultural contextualiza-
tion of Mayan art. The concept u-ba(h), for
example, signifying ‘‘his self/face/person,’’ is
used in such a way as to suggest that some
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representations on stelae were intended to be
portraits of specific individuals (Stuart 1996;
Houston and Stuart 1998). Awareness of
such concepts allows analysts to achieve a
much deeper and more precise understand-
ing of the exact purposes underlying specific
iconographic choices in Mayan rulers’ strat-
egies of self-presentation.
Both art historians and archaeologists also
see style as a fundamental interpretive re-
source and object of explanation, but they
differ in the way they place it in a broader
social and cultural context. The critical trad-
ition in art history, heir to Kant and Hegel
through Winckelmann, distinguishes be-
tween ‘‘archaeological questions’’ – concern-
ing brute facts of the material from which an
object is made, physical aspects of its con-
struction and placement – and ‘‘critical ques-
tions’’ which address style as the expression
of the cultural freedom of the human mind.
Style is held to articulate a relationship or
attitude to the world and its objects, repre-
sented in art through the specific stylistic
treatment of these objects or aspects of the
world (landscape, people, artefacts) as repre-
sented in images (Podro 1982; Schapiro
1951). Congruent with the modern concep-
tion of art, the focus of art historians’ style
analysis is either the critical appreciation of a
creative artist’s individual inflection of in-
herited tradition (Baxandall 1985), and the
personal attitudes expressed by that inflec-
tion, or an intuitive linking of shared pat-
terns of stylistic expression to broader
aspects of culture, indicating, for example,
a period or group mentality or attitude
(Panofsky 1939, 1951; Pollitt 1972).
Early twentieth-century cultural historical
archaeology shared the concept of style as an
expression of group identity and mentality.
Since the 1960s, however, archaeologists’
contextualizations of style have had a
strongly sociological character, whether as a
passive indicator of social processes or more
recently as a marker consciously manipu-
lated by culturally strategic agents. In either
case, the features of style are connected to
their context not by intuition or analogy, but
through causal or functional models. These
link the specific stylistic features of the arte-
facts in question with social structure, by
reconstructing the production systems
which generated the artefacts, and the social
systems that lie behind the objects and their
social uses as revealed in the systematic pat-
terning of their distribution in contexts of
deposition (Davis 1990; Conkey 1990). The
social functions being performed by style
may be held by archaeologists to be recogniz-
able even while the specific cultural mean-
ings of prehistoric styles, in the absence of
textual keys, may be thought to be archae-
ologically irrecoverable (Earle 1990). Al-
though the costs of such a reduced emphasis
on the cultural specifics of style seem rather
high, especially from an art historical point
of view, it does have considerable advantages
in trying to generalize across contexts, and
develop broad models of the relationship be-
tween style and social structure (see below),
in contrast to art historians’ emphasis on the
particularities of single cultural traditions.
These differences of emphasis can, how-
ever, have far reaching practical entailments
when the assumptions encoded in the
modern concept of art – as autonomous
objects of aesthetic contemplation, the im-
aginative expression of creative individuals
– are extended to archaeological artefacts.
This is well illustrated by the fate of Cycladic
marble figurines in the twentieth century
(Figure 19.5). Largely ignored when they
were first discovered in the late nineteenth
century, these objects became increasingly
fashionable during the course of the twenti-
eth century due to their apparent formal
similarity to the modernist sculpture of
Epstein and Brancusi. Reclassified from arte-
factual curiosity to work of art, celebrated as
the first stirrings of the spirit of European
abstraction by aesthetes (Renfrew 1991),
and attributed to individual ‘‘masters’’ by
art historian connoisseurs with close rela-
tions with collectors and dealers (Getz-
Preziosi 1987), Cycladic ‘‘idols’’ became
‘‘must have’’ objects of aesthetic desire on
the part of museums and collectors, fueling
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an orgy of illicit excavation of early Bronze
Age Cycladic cemeteries. This destroyed for-
ever all the contextual information that
might have allowed us to understand the
social uses and cultural meanings of these
fascinating images (Gill and Chippindale
1993). Correspondingly, while many art his-
torians have quite close connections with the
art market – providing attributions in their
areas of expertise, authenticating works,
writing catalogues for dealers’ exhibitions
and auctions – the relationship between
archaeologists and the art antiquities market
is one of generally undisguised hostility, and
those who ignore the ethical standards
upheld by most practitioners of the field,
are looked on with some disdain (Tubb and
Brodie 2001; Corbey 2000).
In practice, the more complex the society
whose art archaeologists seek to understand,
and the richer the textual resources available
to them from that society, the nearer
are the theories and methods commonly
used to those of mainstream art historians.
Perhaps the most conflict-ridden and stimu-
lating fields are those of protohistoric soci-
eties – on the edge of history, with some but
limited textual materials. In the interpret-
ation of early Chinese ritual bronzes (see
Whitfield 1993), Sarah Allan (1993) adopts
a conventional iconographic methodology,
interpreting the development of animal/mon-
ster motifs – the taotie (Figure 19.6) – as
encodings of specific myths and beliefs of
Shang religion. Robert Bagley (1993) denies
the possibility of recovering such precise
meanings on the basis of texts for the most
part later than the bronzes in question, and
explains the decoration in terms of the evolu-
tion of technologies of bronze casting and the
characteristic design style to which they gave
rise. Turning away from a focus on art pro-
duction, Jessica Rawson (1993) explains the
vessels’styleand iconography in termsof their
Figure 19.5 Cycladic marble figurine, ca. 2500
bc. Ht: 76.8cm. British Museum GR 1971.
5–21.1. Photo: Museum
Figure 19.6 Bronze ritual vessel, hu. Shang Dyn-
asty, 1300–1100 bc. Ht: 29.8cm British Museum,
OA 1983. 3-18.1. Photo: Museum.
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consumption (ritual dining) and deposition
(burials), as means by which attention might
be differentially attached to vessels with dif-
ferent functions and status, and to the varying
social ranking of their owners and users.
Art and the Evolution of Social
Complexity
The art of the large majority of the societies,
cultures, and artistic traditions known to
modern researchers has been recovered ar-
chaeologically. Archaeological students of
art are thus in a particularly strong position
to explore fundamental questions about the
relationship between art and the develop-
ment of social complexity. Both cultural
historical archaeology and processual
archaeology recognized that development
of sophisticated, specifically monumental,
art traditions was both a good marker, and
constitutive of the development of urbanism,
states, and civilizations, although the mech-
anisms connecting art and society were left
underexplored, and the qualitative aesthetic
features of the art rather ignored (Childe
1950; Willey 1962; Renfrew 1972).
A more stylistically oriented interest in the
relationship between social and political
structure and the structure of systems of art-
istic representation goes back to Hegel’s
grand evolutionary scheme of the develop-
ment of Western art. It has been revived in
sociologically more sophisticated forms, in-
corporating contemporary research in per-
ception and cognitive psychology, both in
grand versions of the history of Western art
(Witkin 1995), and more modest accounts
exploring particular social, cultural, and art-
istic transitions (Baines 1985). Work in the
‘‘archaeology of contextual meaning’’ op-
poses such ‘‘totalizing’’ grand narratives,
and questions the possibility of cross-cul-
tural comparison (Hodder 1987, 1991:
121–55). It parallels traditional icono-
graphic art history in emphasizing the social
and cultural particularity of the contents of
visual symbolism, which articulates systems
of social relations or legitimates structures of
domination (Taylor 1987; cf. Zanker 1988
for a classic example of such a study in
Roman art and archaeology).
The most sophisticated of current studies
seek to combine close analysis of particular
cases with the development of generalizing
models. Flannery (1999), for example, has
explored the use made of art in the transition
from chiefdoms to states. He suggests that
while the cultural repertoire in each case is
unique, there are close parallels in the ways
that visual symbolism is used across cases of
state formation – to break down old loyal-
ties, symbolize the state’s capacity for vio-
lence, and reconfigure ideologies to fit more
closely the structure of the emergent state.
Baines and Yoffee (2000) have developed a
general model to explain the structure and
function of art in early state-based civiliza-
tions. They argue that the development of
the characteristic civilizational styles of
Egypt and Mesopotamia are linked to an
ideology of order which undergirded elite
identity and legitimacy. The centralized con-
trol of labor-intensive production and ritual-
ized consumption of a new order of highly
stylized artefacts, materialized a new ideol-
ogy of order and was instrumental in social-
izing members of the elite into their new roles
and as an embodiment of a monopoly of
symbolic legitimacy.
From an art historical or contextual ar-
chaeological view, such work might seem to
abstract too much from the specifics of the
visual forms used in particular cases, and the
implications that these aesthetic features
might have for the relative success of differ-
ent visual strategies, or for the qualitative
experience of relationships of power and
solidarity particular to specific societies. In
some degree it is a matter of intellectual
taste, whether one emphasizes the detailed
particularistic contextual analysis of the art
of a single time and place, or prefers to de-
velop generalizing models which abstract
from cultural particulars. It should not be
assumed, however, that the relationship
between particularity and generalization is
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necessarily a zero sum game. Layton (1985,
2000), for example, has explored some of the
commonalities of hunter-gatherer rock art
traditions, shared by virtue of their common
social structures and similar relation to their
environment, and the differences, notably in
style and iconography, which cut across dif-
ferent groups of hunter-gatherers – for
example, the South African San Bushmen
and Australian aborigines – according to
their distinctive social organization (totemic
clans versus bands with no totemic clans).
Similarly, Blanton et al. (1996) have ex-
plored the different kinds of art work spon-
sored by differently organized early states in
Mesoamerica. Their arguments suggest that
‘‘corporate’’ states, like classic Teotihuacan,
ruled by relatively egalitarian elites, charac-
teristically sponsor monumental architecture
designed for large-scale celebration of com-
munal rituals and iconography representing
collective participation in such rituals. By
contrast, ‘‘network states’’ like the early
Olmec, characterized by highly individualis-
tic power strategies and a single dominant
ruler, also sponsor monumental art, but
often of an exclusionary and hierarchical
kind, whether palaces or princely burials
for a ruler or monumental individualized
portraits (Figure 19.7). This comparative
archaeology of art, whether internal to
cultural traditions or across cultures, repre-
sents one of the most distinctive and
promising areas of archaeological contribu-
tion to the understanding of art in the
coming years.
Conclusion
We have discussed how archaeologists study-
ing art have been able to draw upon the
theories and methods of three neighboring
disciplines: art history, social anthropology,
and evolutionary biology. We have shown
how the application of such ideas and
methods presents particular problems for
archaeology, but how archaeology has its
own, distinctive contributions to make to
each debate. With regard to evolutionary
biology, archaeology has been able to extend
the study of cognitive evolution to art, and
cast some doubt on the reductionism of some
evolutionary explanations. On the other
hand, some of the hypotheses advanced for
the role of art in human adaptation remain
speculative. Archaeology has an incompar-
able advantage over the snapshot-like field
studies of social anthropology, yet archae-
ologists cannot observe or interview the
artists whose work they study. Although pre-
historic archaeologists should resist at-
tempting to recreate in much detail the
worlds of intersubjective meaning unpacked
by anthropologists’ participant observation,
archaeologists working on the art of histor-
ical periods are, with sufficiently helpful
textual sources, better able to emulate an-
thropologists’ interpretive approaches. Even
when they lack such sources, archaeologists
have considerably extended the range of
comparative case material available, testing
and refining Eurocentric theories about the
historical trajectory of art traditions that ac-
company the growth of complex social
systems, and developing generalizing models
which go beyond the sometimes narrowly
particularistic approaches of conventional
art history.
Figure 19.7 Olmec head, from La Venta Archae-
ological Park, originally San Lorenzo, Veracruz,
Mexico, ca. 1150–1000 bc. Photo: Jeremy
Tanner.
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